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In its en banc ruling in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 1 the Federal Circuit attempted to settle much of the confusion surrounding appellate review of claim construction with a simple bright-line rule--it declared that claim construction is a pure matter of law with no underlying factual inquiries, and therefore reviewable de novo on appeal. In the years leading up to Cybor, the federal district courts were struggling to apply the Federal Circuit's rules on claim construction, and the Federal Circuit and the district courts were struggling to parse the issues of fact and law implicated in claim construction. The promise of Cybor was in its simplicity. No longer would the district courts have to separate issues of law and fact in claim construction, and by securing de novo review the Federal Circuit would be freer to lead by example and could ensure consistency and uniformity in claim construction by taking the issue for itself. Further, the Cybor ruling has been understood as wholly consistent with the Supreme Court's prior decision on claim construction in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.
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In this Comment, I argue that, counterintuitively, the bright-line rule drawn by Cybor has resulted in a great deal of inconsistency in the Federal Circuit's claim construction jurisprudence. The reason for this, I argue, is that certain issues underlying claim construction are Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals to solve these problems and to bring greater uniformity to patent law. 10 For reasons of efficiency, and to alleviate concern that the Federal Circuit would become too narrowly specialized and develop an institutional bias, 11 the Federal Circuit was also given responsibility for appeals from various administrative and specialty courts (e.g., the Court of Veterans' Appeals). 12 As the lone appellate court in the federal system whose jurisdiction is based on subject matter rather than geography, the Federal Circuit is a sustained experiment, 13 and its unique aspects raise questions about whether it should fill the same role in the federal court system as the regional circuits, relative to the district courts and the Supreme Court. Professor Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss wrote the seminal article on the Federal Circuit in 1989.
14 In the article, she assessed the court's performance over the previous years, predicted some of its challenges for the future, and argued that its most significant overall challenge would be "to develop a concept of itself as a court."
15 Professor Dreyfuss noted that the Federal Circuit's superior expertise and experience in patent law strained the assumption underlying Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 16 -that district courts are in a better position to decide factual issues. 17 Rule 52(a)'s requirement of deference to factual findings of trial courts also "puts pressure ten combined with the disparity among the regional circuits to create a "high-risk game of forum-shopping"). 10 See Craig Allen Nard, Process Considerations in the Age of Markman and Mantras, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 355, 356 (arguing that "uniformity" and "certainty" have recently "achieved mantra status"). 11 See FEDERAL CIRCUIT HISTORY, supra note 6, at 12-13 (describing the reasoning behind the legislation that created the Federal Circuit). 12 Id. 13 See Dreyfuss, supra note 7, at 3 (referring to the Federal Circuit as a "sustained experiment in specialization"). 14 Id. 15 Id. at 5. 16 FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) provides in relevant part that
[i]n all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon . . . . Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses. 17 Dreyfuss, supra note 7, at 48 ("Where . . . the trial court is composed of generalists and the appellate court is staffed to deal with the complex factual issues being tried, the assumption breaks down, for the appellate court is at least as well situated to find the facts as the trial court.").
on the distinction between fact and law." 18 Thus, the article stated, the challenge to the Federal Circuit in developing a concept of itself as a court would include the resolution of procedural issues 19 and finding "some method for reversing [district court] decisions that it believes are unresponsive to the spirit of its teachings." 20 The article seems to have accurately predicted the future of the Federal Circuit in this regard, for one of the procedural issues that has risen to great importance recently is the Federal Circuit's review of claim construction. This Comment argues that, through its decision in Cybor, the Federal Circuit has found a way to reverse district court decisions that are unresponsive to its teachings, but has done so in a way that has clouded the clarity of its teachings.
B. Claim Construction
Claim construction is probably the most important issue in patent infringement litigation. 21 Like the interpretation of a statute or a contract, claim construction is the process by which a court determines the meaning of the words in a patent claim for the purposes of the litigation. This is important because the scope of an inventor's patent, and consequently her right to sue others for infringement, is determined entirely by the meaning that the court gives to the claims of the patent document, not by the physical invention, the history of the inventive process, or anything else filed in the patent office. 22 When an inventor files for a patent, her application must include: (1) a written description of the invention, including a description of the field (e.g., chemistry, circuit design, microbiology, etc.), a description of the prior art, and a detailed description of the invention that the inventor seeks to patent; 23 (2) drawings of the invention, if neces- 18 Id. 19 Id. at 61-63. 20 Id. at 50. 21 See, e.g., John F. Duffy, On Improving the Legal Process of Claim Interpretation: Administrative Alternatives, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 109, 109 (2000) (noting that claim interpretation is "frequently the central issue in infringement litigation"). 22 See, e.g., Gen. Foods Corp. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH, 972 F.2d 1272, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (explaining that the claims of the patent document "define or delimit the scope of the legal protection which the government grant gives the patent owner, the patent 'monopoly'"). The prosecution history, physical embodiments, and other "extrinsic evidence" may affect the meaning that the court gives to the claims, but it is the claims, as construed by the court, that determine the scope of an inventor's right to sue for infringement. 23 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) . [Vol. 153: 763 sary; 24 and (3) claims. 25 In the claims portion of the application, the inventor cabins the scope of the patent by "particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." 26 When an inventor accuses another of infringing her patent, the question of infringement hinges on whether the accused infringer's device contains "all elements" of the patent claim that is allegedly infringed. 27 Thus, if an inventor were to claim "a writing implement comprising: (a) a wooden cylinder with a hollow core, (b) a cylinder of graphite in said hollow core, and (c) a small cylinder of eraser material attached to one end of the wooden cylinder," a typical wooden pencil with a metal shirt-pocket clip added to it would literally infringe the claim because it contains all three elements of the claim, while a typical pencil without an eraser would not, because it lacks element (c).
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Most patent infringement trials, however, involve technology more complex than wooden pencils, and the first step of any patent infringement trial is for the trial court to read the patent claims and determine their meaning. 29 Once the trial court construes the claims, the next step is to compare the claims to the accused device. 30 It often happens that the trial court's claim construction either clearly does or does not encompass the infringer's device, and it becomes unnecessary to proceed further to the question of infringement. Cir. 1983 ) ("Determination of patent infringement requires two steps: the meaning of the claims must be learned from a study of all relevant patent documents; and the claims must be applied to the accused structures."). 30 The trial court's claim construction is also instrumental to many of the affirmative defenses and counterclaims commonly asserted in patent litigation, such as obviousness and anticipation by prior art. )) (describing obviousness as a determination that "lends itself to several basic factual inquiries" and holding that "the subsidiary determinations of the District Court, at the least, ought to be subject to the Rule").
not apply in that case 37 and remanded the case to the Federal Circuit for "consideration in light of Rule 52(a)."
38 On remand, the Federal Circuit panel did not challenge the applicability of Rule 52(a), but stated instead that it had applied Rule 52(a) faithfully in the past, 39 and restated its obviousness analysis more clearly. The result was that obviousness was labeled a conclusion of law that is based on underlying factual inquiries, and the Federal Circuit essentially reiterated a mixed standard of review for obviousness. "Like all legal conclusions," the panel stated, "[the legal conclusion] under § 103 rests on a factual evidentiary foundation." 40 The Panduit cases further established that a mixed standard of review, in which the Federal Circuit reviews legal conclusions de novo and factual inquiries underlying the legal conclusions for clear error, necessarily follows from Rule 52(a). After the Panduit cases, the Federal Circuit seemed content to stick to the mixed standard of review, and applied it to many of the issues in pat- 37 and applicability of the on-sale bar.
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Claim construction, like the issues noted above, is a legal conclusion. The Federal Circuit debated for many years whether claim construction involves underlying factual inquiries, and if so, what the implications of those inquiries would be for infringement trials and appellate review. Before 1995, no case had squarely addressed whether there was ever a right to have claim construction tried to a jury, nor had any case addressed whether claim construction was a pure issue of law or a legal conclusion with underlying factual inquiries. In Markman I, 45 which came before the court in 1995, the Federal Circuit addressed en banc the issue of whether claim construction must be tried to a jury. The district court judge, reversing the jury verdict and entering judgment as a matter of law, decided that claim construction was a matter of law for the courts and that "[a] mere dispute concerning the meaning of a term does not itself create a genuine issue of material fact." 46 The plaintiff, Herbert Markman, appealed, arguing inter alia that his testimony and his expert's testimony raised a question of fact as to the construction of the claims, and that deference was there- 41 fore due the jury's claim construction. 47 The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court, stating that:
We therefore settle inconsistencies in our precedent and hold that in a case tried to a jury, the court has the power and obligation to construe as a matter of law the meaning of language used in the patent claim. As such, "[a] patent covers the invention or inventions which the court, in construing its provisions, decides that it describes and claims." Because claim construction is a matter of law, the construction given the claims is reviewed de novo on appeal. 48 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the narrow issue of whether the Seventh Amendment requires claim construction to be tried to a jury, 49 and unanimously held that it did not.
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The Court looked to history and its own precedent and found that, although neither interpretive source provided a clear answer, there was scant evidence showing that judges ordinarily construed patent documents 51 and no evidence supporting a right to have claim construction tried to a jury. "Where history and precedent provide [d] no clear answers," the Court turned to what it termed "functional considerations," 52 and ultimately held that, because judges were better qualified than juries to construe claims and because allocating the issue to judges would better serve the purpose of uniformity, "the construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the province of the court."
53
Because the Supreme Court's decision resolved only the narrow issue of whether the Seventh Amendment requires that claim construction be tried to a jury, the ensuing two years were marked by disagreement among the judges of the Federal Circuit as to whether deference is ever due, under Rule 52(a), to district courts' claim 47 Markman I, 52 F.3d at 974. 48 Id. at 979 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 49 constructions. The Federal Circuit took the issue en banc in 1998, and a nine-judge majority held that "as a purely legal question, we review claim construction de novo on appeal including any allegedly factbased questions relating to claim construction," 54 and stated repeatedly that claim construction is a purely legal issue. Cybor thus drew a bright-line rule in the sense that it simplified appellate review of claim construction. This Comment argues that Cybor's seemingly simple rule has in fact clouded the clarity of the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence and made it more difficult for the district courts to apply its rules consistently.
The Federal Circuit recently granted rehearing en banc in Phillips v. AWH Corp.
55 to resolve several questions about how it performs claim construction. Most of the issues that the court selected for en banc resolution relate to the bifurcation of the court's methodology, 56 and to the role of dictionaries and other interpretive sources in the claim construction process. The final question in the order, however, suggests that the court may be willing to address an aspect of its holding in Cybor. This Part argues that Cybor was wrongly decided in light of prior Federal Circuit precedent and the Supreme Court's decision in Markman II. By 1998, the Federal Circuit had developed a body of case law on claim construction that, while imperfect, still sent a few clear messages to the district courts. By indirectly contradicting many of these messages, the Federal Circuit clouded the clarity of its case law.
A. Inconsistency with the Supreme CourtThe Cybor and Markman Decisions
Cybor is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Markman II, first because it goes beyond the scope of Markman II and directly contradicts some of Markman II's reasoning, and second because its approach to the fact/law distinction is at odds with the Supreme Court's teachings in Markman II. Rather than classifying claim construction along the lines of fact and law, the holding of Markman II rested on policy grounds, and the Cybor majority seems to have ignored this important point. Because of the timing of the decision 60 and the fact that it construed a Supreme Court opinion, the rule it announced had the combined weight of an en banc opinion and the appearance of the imprimatur of the Supreme Court.
Several commentators have noted that Cybor went beyond the scope of the holding of Markman II, 61 and the concurring and dissenting judges in Cybor criticized the majority opinion as an overbroad in- 59 Id. 60 The Supreme Court decided Markman II on April 23, 1996, Markman II, 517 U.S. at 370, and less than seventeen months later, on September 7, 1997, the Federal Circuit decided, sua sponte, to hear Cybor en banc, Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1451. Thus, before divergent panel interpretations had a chance to develop momentum, the Federal Circuit had the rare opportunity to write the definitive interpretation of a Supreme Court opinion. 61 terpretation of Markman II. 62 While Markman II clearly held that the Seventh Amendment did not require that claim construction be tried to juries, 63 it was largely silent on the other points of disagreement among the Federal Circuit judges in Markman I. The other major criticism of Cybor regarding the scope of Markman II is that Cybor downplayed Supreme Court dicta implying that claim construction could implicate underlying factual inquiries. In Markman II, while struggling to classify claim construction, the Court stated: (1) that "construing a term of art following receipt of evidence" is a "mongrel practice," 64 (2) that the issue "falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact," 65 and (3) that, in weighing expert testimony, "we expect [that] credibility determinations will be subsumed within the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole [patent] document."
66 As these statements were essentially dicta, the Cybor majority easily downplayed the first two statements as "only prefatory comments" 67 and the third as actually supporting its rule.
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After explaining away the Supreme Court's dicta, the majority made a brief concession to the viability of a narrow reading of Markman II,
See Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1463-64 (Mayer, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 1473 (Rader, J., "dissenting from the pronouncements on claim interpretation in the en banc opinion, concurring in the judgment, and joining part IV of the en banc opinion"); id. at 1478 (Newman, J., dissenting in part and expressing additional views). Judge Rader went further and insisted, as he had in Markman I, that both Markman cases presented only jury issues and that "this court has yet even to receive briefing and oral argument on the proper standard of review for a trial court's claim construction." Id. 1473 (Rader, J., dissenting in part); see also Markman I, 52 F.3d at 998 (Rader. J., concurring in the judgment) ("Whether claim construction can involve subsidiary fact issues is not before us."). 63 Markman II, 517 U.S. at 384 n.9. 64 Id. at 378. This "mongrel practice" reference appears to be the most frequently cited phrase to support the proposition that the Supreme Court considered claim construction to be a mixed issue of fact and law. Professor Rai notes this phrase in particular and argues that the Cybor decision "was necessary because the Supreme Court's disposition of the Markman case noted (though it did not specifically hold) that claim construction had factual underpinnings." Rai, supra note 61, at 1047-48 & n.49; see also Moore, supra note 32, at 8 n.34 (noting that the Supreme Court referred to claim construction as a "mongrel practice"); Nard, supra note 10, at 364 (same); Hulse, supra note 61, at 90 (same Continuing to read Markman II as supporting its rule, the majority asserted that "[n]othing in the Supreme Court's opinion supports the view that the Court endorsed a silent, third option-that claim construction may involve subsidiary or underlying questions of fact."
71 While these criticisms of what is essentially sweeping dicta under the rug are valid, they fail to explain why the dicta matter. Despite some questionable dicta, the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed Markman I and expressed confidence in the Federal Circuit and its role at the head of the patent system.
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The more important distinction between Cybor and Markman IIand where many commentators seem to have missed the point-is that where the Supreme Court opinion may be read as having granted an exception to Rule 52(a) for policy reasons, the Federal Circuit tried to fit claim construction into Rule 52(a) by reclassifying it as a matter of law. The Supreme Court, in reaching its conclusion, found that "history and precedent provide[d] no clear answers," resorted to "functional considerations," 73 and ultimately decided as a matter of policy that there was "sufficient reason to treat construction of terms of art like many other responsibilities that we cede to a judge in the normal course of trial, notwithstanding its evidentiary underpinnings."
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Here the Supreme Court indirectly contradicted the Markman I analysis, and acknowledged that it was allocating claim construction to trial judges instead of juries for policy reasons. Further, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the idea that its holding rested on the fact/law distinction. 75 
B. Inconsistency with Federal Circuit Precedent-
The "Canons of Claim Construction"
Much has been written about the fact/law distinction, and it is beyond the scope of this Comment to discuss whether there is any significance to it beyond serving as a functional way of allocating work between judges and juries and determining the scope of appellate review. 77 For this analysis, I simply accept the proposition that, because the Federal Circuit is the central judicial authority on the patent law, it is to some extent the court's prerogative to label issues as fact or law as it sees fit. 78 The problem, however, is that the issues that arise in For claim construction, by the time Markman and Cybor were decided, the Federal Circuit had already labeled certain issues as questions of fact such that it was internally inconsistent to call claim construction a pure matter of law. Thus, by declaring that claim construction was a pure matter of law, the Federal Circuit cast doubt on the status of anticipation, obviousness, enablement, and expert witness testimony.
First, it is worth noting that one of the aspects of patent law that adds to its clarity is that the Federal Circuit and its predecessors have explained some issues by reference to other issues. For example, a defense to patent infringement is anticipation of the patent by prior art. Though it is never necessary to so hold, a disclosure that anticipates under § 102 also renders the claim invalid under § 103, for anticipation is the epitome of obviousness. The reverse is not true, for the need to determine obviousness presumes anticipation is lacking.
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The courts have fashioned a different relationship between anticipation and obviousness-obviousness is a broader inquiry than anticipation, but it circumscribes the inquiry for anticipation, and it would upset expectations and internal consistency to change the nature of the anticipation inquiry without regard for the obviousness inquiry.
Claim construction is a similar situation in that the process has been made clearer by associating it with other aspects of patent litigation that have already been labeled as issues of fact. The process of claim construction has been explained primarily by limiting the sources which may be used in claim construction, and by creating certain "canons" of construction meant to guide the process. Some canons require the district court to preemptively perform inquiries that the Federal Circuit has definitively labeled as questions of fact.
For example, two of the "canons" of claim construction require the trial court to perform inquiries that are indistinguishable from the infringement and anticipation analyses. Where possible, the district court must construe the claims to include the inventor's device and also to exclude prior art. These principles are commonly stated as "a claim interpretation that would exclude the inventor's device is rarely to be reviewed for clear error); see also 
"). Professor
Dreyfuss notes that the Federal Circuit has done a thorough and thoughtful job developing the problem of obviousness, and in its current form it still bears a significant resemblance to the anticipation analysis. See Dreyfuss, supra note 7, at 8-11 (discussing the Federal Circuit's evolving approach to the obviousness requirement).
the correct interpretation," 84 and "claims should be read in a way that avoids ensnaring prior art if it is possible to do so." 85 These principles preserve the notion that an inventor drafts claims with the intent of protecting her invention 86 and the presumption that a patent is valid.
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To apply these principles to claim construction, the district court must compare the scope of its claim construction with prior art and with the inventor's device. The Federal Circuit has repeatedly stated that this type of inquiry is a question of fact.
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Thus, claim construction must involve underlying questions of fact, at least where a question arises as to whether the scope of the district court's claim construction excludes the inventor's device or unnecessarily includes prior art. Yet, the Federal Circuit has never meaningfully explained how the anticipation and infringement analyses are performed differently in the context of claim construction.
A third canon of claim construction is that:
Where there is an equal choice between a broader and a narrower meaning of a claim, and there is an enabling disclosure that indicates that the applicant is at least entitled to a claim having the narrower meaning, we consider the notice function of the claim to be best served by adopting the narrower meaning.
89
Application of this principle requires the trial court to decide whether there is an enabling disclosure that entitles the patentee to the narrower meaning. This enablement requirement has been labeled as a question of law that may implicate underlying factual inquiries. 90 Although not as glaring as the discrepancy noted above re- garding anticipation and infringement law, applying this canon still requires the district court to perform an analysis that includes factfinding, although Cybor definitively holds that it does not.
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All three of the above-mentioned canons of claim construction have clarified the process of claim construction, but they have also defined the process by reference to certain inquiries that the Federal Circuit has already labeled as questions of fact. 92 Declaring that claim construction has no underlying issues of fact has created an inconsistency between the Cybor rule and the settled understanding of the factual nature of the inquiries underlying claim construction.
Thus, by the time Cybor was decided, the Federal Circuit had already defined claim construction largely by connecting it with other issues in patent litigation. Just as the judge must do in deciding obviousness, anticipation, or enablement, she must perform certain factual inquiries en route to the conclusions of claim construction. By denying this fact, the Federal Circuit damaged the overall coherence of the patent law, which largely depends on its internal consistency. As the next section explains, this disturbance in doctrine has created problems in practice for litigants and district court judges.
Cir. 2001) ("As is often true of legal questions, however, the ultimate legal conclusion of enablement rests on factual underpinnings. When the district court's judgment on enablement rests on these factual underpinnings, this court reviews the decision for clearly erroneous findings of fact and errors of law."). 91 Under the procedural approach, the court begins with the "plain meaning" as the presumptive interpretation of the claim. Any deviation from the plain meaning requires a strong justification, and is done according to a predetermined path of analysis through a hierarchy of interpretive sources (e.g., the written description, expert testimony, etc. . 1999 ). The rise of the procedural approach may undermine the utility, and to some extent the validity of the "canons." This is not certain, however, and the canons often serve as "tiebreakers" whenever an interpretive process arrives at more than one viable construction, and are to that extent independent of any interpretive approach. See, e.g., Athletic Alternatives, 73 F.3d at 1581 (employing a "tiebreaker" rule where two equally plausible meanings for a claim term were possible).
III. THE EFFECTS OF THE CYBOR RULE
Part II described the doctrinal consequences of Cybor. This Part traces the effects of the rule in practice. Because of the doctrinal inconsistency between Cybor and the Federal Circuit's precedents, the Federal Circuit has had to resort to strained logic to shoehorn claim construction into the confines of a purely legal issue. In other words, the problem with Cybor is not so much that the Federal Circuit decided for policy reasons to treat claim construction as an issue of law, but rather that, to justify its decision ex post, it began trying to force claim construction to behave as a purely legal issue. The results have shown that claim construction is, to some extent, an inherently factual issue. The results of this contradiction have included Federal Circuit remands for factfinding disguised as something else, a reluctance by some judges to apply the rule strictly, seepage of the Cybor legal fiction into issues beyond claim construction and, worst of all, confusion in the district courts. This Part describes these effects.
A. Strained Logic and Federal Circuit Remands
The most problematic and transparently contradictory aspect of the Federal Circuit's post-Cybor claim construction jurisprudence is its treatment of expert testimony and other extrinsic evidence offered in claim construction hearings. It is a general rule in federal litigation that a trial court's weighing of expert testimony is a credibility determination, an evidentiary finding of fact, and reviewed for clear error. 93 In Cybor and Markman I, however, the majorities insisted that a trial judge's use of expert testimony geared toward claim construction is not a finding of fact. Basically, the explanation goes, because expert testimony is of limited use during claim construction (it may not be used to contradict intrinsic evidence), and because it is only used to 93 See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses."). As the Supreme Court has noted:
[W]hen a trial judge's finding is based on his decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, each of whom has told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985) ; see also Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 823 F.2d 1538, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("When, as here, the evidence consists solely of competing expert opinions, we have no basis for overturning the district court's credibility determinations." (citing Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575)).
assist the court in its understanding of the patent documents, the district court's use of such testimony is not a finding of fact. As the Federal Circuit stated in Markman I:
Through this process of construing claims by, among other things, using certain extrinsic evidence that the court finds helpful and rejecting other evidence as unhelpful . . . the court is not crediting certain evidence over other evidence or making factual evidentiary findings. Rather, the court is looking to the extrinsic evidence to assist in its construction of the written document, a task it is required to perform. The district court's claim construction, enlightened by such extrinsic evidence as may be helpful, is still based upon the patent and prosecution history. It is therefore still construction, and is a matter of law subject to de novo review.
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This explanation belies the partiality of expert testimony. Although the Federal Rules of Evidence allow a district court to appoint an independent expert who might be better suited to this task, 95 the courts typically allow the parties to appoint their own experts. 96 This results in the same "battle of the experts" that occurs in medical malpractice and products liability cases and in the damages phase of many complicated civil suits. Patent litigants hire the most qualified expert they can to testify to a construction that suits their interest. When a district court judge agrees with the testimony of one expert over another in performing claim construction, the judge has credited that evidence over other evidence. 97 To insist that this is not a credi- Under the guise of setting standards for claim construction, this court instructs experienced trial judges that they may use experts to understand, but not to interpret, the claim terms. As a matter of logic, this instruction is difficult to grasp. . . . How will this perverse incentive to "hide the ball" improve appellate review?
bility judgment, but that the judge has only found that expert's testimony more "helpful," is a semantic distinction that does not satisfactorily explain why the examination of expert testimony during claim construction is not a question of fact. This type of strained logic is exemplary of the difficulty the Federal Circuit has had in keeping its practice consistent with the statement that claim construction never has any underlying factual inquiries. If it were indeed true that claim construction is a purely legal analysis, then it would seem that the Federal Circuit would always be able to perform claim construction de novo, and could avail itself of certain "extrinsic" sources, such as dictionaries, technical treatises, etc. 98 The patent documents, prosecution history, and other "intrinsic evidence" are all a matter of public record and almost always available to the Federal Circuit on appeal. Additionally, extrinsic sources such as treatises and dictionaries need not be part of the record below to be available to the Federal Circuit for use in claim construction. Despite this, the Federal Circuit has been occasionally unable to construe claims for itself and forced to remand cases to the district courts with instructions to collect and evaluate extrinsic evidence, sometimes in the form of competing expert witness testimony from the parties. Two exemplary cases are discussed briefly below.
In Apex Inc. v. Raritan Computer, Inc., 99 the Federal Circuit found the evidence insufficient to perform claim construction and remanded the case to the district court to determine the meaning, to one skilled in the art, of the limiting terms "circuit," "interface," and "unit." 100 The Federal Circuit noted that, as with obviousness, to resolve the question of the understanding of one skilled in the art (which is a factual inquiry under the obviousness analysis 101 ), "it is appropriate to look to extrinsic evidence, including but not limited to dictionaries and expert testimony to assist the trier of fact in under- hile the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law," the non-obviousness requirement "lends itself to several factual inquiries," including "the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art").
standing the evidence."
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The panel seemed aware of the inherent contradiction, but refused to acknowledge directly that it was remanding for factfinding. The court stated that, "[w]hile this court is plainly aware that claim construction is a question of law, we decline to construe every claim limitation because the record has not been sufficiently developed." 103 In NeoMagic Corp. v. Trident Microsystems, Inc., 104 despite the fact that both parties offered evidence, the Federal Circuit was similarly unable to determine on its own "whether or not one of skill in the art would understand that a power supply is designed to provide a constant voltage to a circuit."
105 Although the Federal Circuit reiterated that claim construction is a matter of law and subject to de novo review, it was forced to remand the case to the district court. Further, the court specifically ordered an evidentiary hearing with competing expert testimony to resolve the issue. The court stated that "we think that this matter can only be resolved by further evidentiary hearings, including expert testimony, before the district court." 106 In both of these cases, and in several others, 107 the inquiries underlying claim construction have been so definitively factual that the Federal Circuit has been forced to remand the cases to the district courts for further weighing of evidence. These remands for "lawfinding" and consideration of expert testimony with regard to its "helpfulness" illustrate the difficulty of applying the Cybor holding with a straight face. As discussed above, the district courts receive contradictory signals from a reviewing court that remands a case for further development of the record but not for factfinding.
B. Reluctance to Apply the Rule Strictly
Further evidence that Cybor is an ill-advised rule is the fact that some federal judges have been reluctant to apply it strictly. Though ostensibly trying to soften the blow of a drastic new rule, Judge Bryson's and Judge Plager's concurring opinions in Cybor 109 clouded the application of the rule even further. In the years following Cybor, a minor line of cases developed that cited these concurring opinions and made it less clear than before to what extent the Federal Circuit intended to apply its de novo reviewing power.
Although the Cybor majority stated definitively that claim construction is to be reviewed without deference, Bryson and Plager seemingly sought to soften the blow of the drastic new rule announced by the majority by providing reassurances that the Federal Circuit will still assign weight to district court opinions as a matter of common sense. Judge Bryson argued that de novo review does not necessitate complete disregard of district court opinions, 110 and Judge Plager asserted that the degree of deference afforded to district court opinions would be flexible in its application, depending on the care with which the claim construction was done and the evidence was used to support it. 111 Beginning with Key Pharmaceuticals v. Hercon Laboratories Corp. 112 -which was decided on November 25, 1998, just six months after Cybor-a few post-Cybor opinions began to reference the concurring opinions 113 and profess that "[o]ur standard of review of claim con-struction is now firmly established: we exercise independent review. However, we do not start from scratch; rather we begin with and carefully consider the trial court's work."
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These cases have not so much undercut Cybor as they have undermined its clarity. It was readily apparent to all of the judges in Cybor that the Federal Circuit was reserving for itself more power to review than it had previously, and that it was adopting a hard-line approach to appellate review of claim construction. The concurring opinions amounted to little more than a promise to read the district court opinions and to use the new power thoughtfully. 115 In one sense, by promising to consider the district courts' claim construction orders, these opinions attempt to strike a compromise between unapologetic de novo review and an overly restrictive standard of deference. On the other hand, the concurrences contradict the clear holding of Cybor and seem to disguise the fact that the Federal Circuit's case law at that point required no deference to the district courts. In either case, the concurrences seem to have acquired very little precedential weight in the case law and do little more than confuse the message sent to district courts and potential litigants.
C. Seepage into Indefiniteness Law
During the years following Cybor, the reclassification of claim construction began to seep into other areas of the Federal Circuit's case law, most notably indefiniteness. In 1998, the court held in 114 Key Pharm., 161 F.3d at 713 (citing Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1462-63 (Plager and Bryson, JJ., concurring separately) (internal citations omitted)). 115 Matthew Hulse points out that the concurring opinions provide no explanation for the need to "create a fiction that credibility is simply a tool of legal construction and not, as generally accepted, a factual inquiry." Hulse, supra note 61, at 100 (footnote omitted). 116 The doctrinal inconsistency of Cybor has thus infected the issue of indefiniteness as well, in a way that has expanded the Federal Circuit's reviewing power while sending more mixed messages to district courts and potential litigants. As noted above, claim construction is linked to many other issues in patent litigation, 126 and this effect could easily spread to other issues.
D. Confusion in the District Courts
A fourth consequence of the Federal Circuit's casting of claim construction as a purely legal matter is that trial courts have reached bizarre conclusions when attempting to force claim construction to behave as a purely legal issue. For example, there are a handful of cases in the Northern District of New York in which district judges have denied parties' requests for discovery in patent cases on the grounds that any fact-related discovery would be irrelevant to claim construction, because claim construction is a pure matter of law. 128 What is important here is not the sequence of discovery, but the grounds on which it was affected in these cases in the Northern District of New York. While the pretrial process depends somewhat on judicial discretion, this discretion should not be informed by an extension of the logical implications of the Cybor rule. Some jurisdictions, such of the Northern District of California, have avoided this and many other problems attendant to discovery in patent cases by adopting local rules specifying how discovery in patent cases is to be conducted. N.D. CAL. CIV. LOCAL R. 16-9 to -10. Such measures have their own costs, such as adding rigidity to the process at the possible expense of efficiency and limiting the discretion of judges. Cf. Hon. Roderick R.
result, but it follows logically from the Federal Circuit's explanation of claim construction as a pure question of law. This result is symptomatic of a larger general pattern of unpredictability in the trial courts. Prior to trial, litigants do not know how far a trial judge will extend the logical implications of casting claim construction as a pure question of law into decisions on other matters.
E. Conclusion
Attempts to force claim construction to behave as a purely legal issue have shown that much of the time it is impossible to do so. Because many of the issues underlying and relating to claim construction are inherently questions of fact, it creates an internal inconsistency when a court tries to declare or explain that they are only questions of law. The main result of this inconsistency has been the sending of mixed messages to trial courts. The Federal Circuit, for example, has remanded claim construction issues for factfinding, but, bound by its holding in Cybor, the court has had to refrain from using the word "fact," giving district courts convoluted and contradictory descriptions of what to do. Additionally, some Federal Circuit judges have strayed from this strict approach and applied a softened version of the Cybor rule that contradicts its holding and only adds to the mixed messages that district courts receive regarding claim construction. This doctrinal confusion has seeped into the Federal Circuit's cases on indefiniteness and had bizarre results in the district courts. These results cast doubt on the continued workability of the Cybor rule. It appears that in Cybor the Federal Circuit intended only to resolve the issue of appellate review, but its justification for that result has threatened the internal consistency of patent law and the very uniformity that Cybor was supposed to protect.
IV. REWRITING CYBOR
As noted above, Professor Dreyfuss identifies one of the major problems facing the Federal Circuit as the need to find a way to reverse district court opinions that are inconsistent with its teachings. 134 and had not taken the opportunity afforded it in Markman II to directly address the points disputed by the judges in Markman I. 135 Further, the commentary and available empirical data indicated that district courts were not absorbing all of the teachings of the Federal Circuit, particularly with respect to claim construction. 136 In short, the Federal Circuit was on its own in 1998, with little more than a permissively worded opinion by the Supreme Court and a mandate to make patent law more uniform. The logical solution at that point was to assert greater control, and to make a bright-line rule that would clear away confusion and result in greater uniformity. 137 As I have argued above, Cybor has had the complete opposite effect and has failed to live up to its promise because of its inconsistency with the rest of patent law.
In this final section, I offer two possible solutions. The first would be for the Federal Circuit to abandon Cybor altogether and treat claim construction as a mixed question of law and fact, much like it already treats obviousness and other issues. The Federal Circuit could address confusion in claim construction by making more bright-line rules that address how the process itself is conducted, and continue to refine its methods of review to make the law clearer. The second approach would be to leave Cybor as good law, but to try to cabin its effects by explaining its holding differently. The Federal Circuit would state clearly that it treats claim construction as a pure legal issue for the limited purpose of appellate review, but it does not purport to label all issues underlying claim construction as pure legal issues. This would be a minor change of course, and would attenuate all of the bad effects described in this Comment. Whichever approach the Federal Circuit takes, it should proceed with regard for how its decisions will affect settled expectations.
A. Solution 1: Overrule Cybor
If the Federal Circuit took the issue of appellate review of claim construction en banc, it would be relatively simple to overrule Cybor and any other cases to the extent that they derecognized the existence tionality or merit," and tend not to "dissect issues"); Gregory D. Leibold, Comment, In Juries We Do Not Trust: Appellate Review of Patent-Infringement Litigation, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 623, 624 (1996) (noting that other common critiques of juries are that they have an excessively high regard for the patent office and that they cannot understand the technology or the legal standards). 137 Professor Duffy argues for this interpretation, stating that "[t]he majority's holding in favor of de novo review must be viewed as an implicit determination that the need for uniformity outweighs the efficiency costs of more vigorous appellate review." Duffy, supra note 21, at 123. While Cybor has not produced the promised uniformity, the choice between de novo review and deferential review of claim construction (or any other issue) in this case is a choice between putting additional pressure on district courts to write better orders (to avoid reversal) and putting additional pressure on the Federal Circuit to make its standards clearer and easier to apply. 138 then it could review each step either de novo or for clear error and avoid sending mixed messages to the district courts. Mixed review is similar to the approach that the Federal Circuit takes to obviousness, and as Chief Judge Markey recognized a long time ago, deference and meaningful guidance to the district courts are not mutually exclusive: The court can continue to note noncontrolling misstatements of law in decisions it affirms, and it can note harmless errors without reversing a district court's disposition. 139 Further, the Federal Circuit has used methods other than aggressive appellate review to make its law on claim construction clearer. It has articulated several canons of claim construction to assist the district courts. 140 The Federal Circuit has also made clear rules about certain terms that arise frequently in claim construction. For example, it is now settled that the word "comprising" as a transition in a patent claim means that the claimed invention includes, but is not limited to, the elements in the claim. 141 The Federal Circuit has also established a series of presumptions in claim construction to clarify the process, such as that the indefinite article "a" or "an" in a patent claim is pre-138 175 F.3d 985 (Fed. Cir. 1999). As Wagner and Petherbridge note, the Federal Circuit has at least two primary approaches to the methodology of claim construction, and Johnson Worldwide is exemplary of the "procedural" approach, in which the Federal Circuit has delineated a hierarchy of interpretive sources in claim construction to resolve situations where the district courts receive conflicting evidence. The procedural approach is much clearer and promises to provide more predictable results than the "holistic" approach. (Markey, C.J.) ("To contribute to consistency . . . this court has affirmed judgments while noting noncontrolling misstatements of law . . . ."). 140 See supra Part II.B (detailing the rules set forth by the Federal Circuit to guide lower courts in issues of claim construction). 141 See ROBERT C. FABER, LANDIS ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING, at § 7 (4th ed. 1996) ("The word 'comprises' has been construed to mean in patent law, 'including the following elements but not excluding others.'" (internal citations omitted)).
sumed to mean "one or more," 142 and that a claim element using the word "means" is presumed to be a means-plus-function claim under 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6, while an element that does not use the word "means" is not.
143 All of these decisions by the Federal Circuit represent steps toward greater clarity and uniformity, and remain viable whether the Federal Circuit keeps or discards Cybor.
Reversing Cybor would give the district courts more responsibility in some cases to do claim construction correctly, and would place more pressure on the Federal Circuit to clarify its teachings. It would make appellate review of claim construction more complicated, in that the court would have to carefully parse factual and legal issues, but no court is better situated to do this than the Federal Circuit itself.
B. Solution 2: Explain Cybor and Rein It In
A second, less drastic solution, and one that may fit more neatly into the limited way in which the court has agreed to address the issue in Phillips, 144 is to leave Cybor as good law to the extent that the Federal Circuit would continue to review claim construction de novo, but to disclaim those parts of the opinion in which the court states that claim construction is always a purely legal issue. 145 This would be a minor adjustment and would attenuate the effects described in Part III. The Federal Circuit would state that, while claim construction may implicate factual issues, the court will treat claim construction as a purely legal issue because, as a matter of policy, it is inefficient and counter- Thus, the Federal Circuit would acknowledge that its classification of claim construction as a purely legal issue is a convenient legal fiction meant to facilitate appellate review and nothing more. This would send a much clearer message to the district courts, and would more accurately describe what actually happens when the Federal Circuit reviews claim construction. Just as other legal fictions, such as implied contracts, are useful in limited circumstances, 147 the fiction of claim construction as a purely legal issue is useful only for the purpose of appellate review. This approach would represent a scaling back of Cybor's scope, but would preserve its holding. 148 And, as stated above, the Federal Circuit could continue to pursue other approaches for improving clarity and uniformity in claim construction. 146 Markman II, 517 U.S. 370, 389 (1996) . Professor Duffy notes that Rule 52(a) might not even be an impediment to this approach because it does not explicitly address mixed questions of fact and law, and he argues that the regional circuits' approach to this issue is not uniform. See Duffy, supra note 21, at 120-21. 147 The common law enforces quasi-contractual obligations to compensate certain parties in the interest of justice, but does not construe quasi-contracts as true contracts because they lack certain contractual elements (e.g., offer and acceptance where, in point of fact, there was no contract, no mutual understanding, and so no promise," and noting that such a construct "is doubtless a legal fiction"). Similarly, the Federal Circuit would state that it treats claim construction as a purely legal issue for policy reasons related to appellate review, but does not expect it to act like a purely legal issue for other purposes, such as remands for factfinding. There is nothing inherently wrong with calling a tail a leg for limited purposes. The problems arise when one subsequently expects the tail to do all of the things that legs do, like supporting one's weight. 148 Wagner, Petherbridge, and Duffy argue that Cybor is best viewed as a reinforcement of the Federal Circuit's institutional status as the authoritative actor in the patent system, particularly for claim construction. Duffy, supra note 21, at 123; Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 92, at 1124. The solution outlined in this subsection would actually support this idea, because by stripping away all of the superfluous justifications, the Federal Circuit would say, essentially, that the holding of Cybor is based solely on institutional reasons, rather than on the idea that certain factual inquiries become legal inquiries in the context of claim construction.
